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Paper Draft

Metaxy or Metanoia? – "On Revolutions, and the Order of History."
Leutzsch: Metaxy or Metanoia? - "On Revolutions, and the Order of History."

Abstract

This paper deals with the concepts of disorder within the theoretical framework of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Eric Voegelin. I will try to give a very brief and unfinished insight into the use of a comparative approach concerning both theories and it is therefore just a first step into two very complex theories of conceptualizing the relationship between the power of reflection and the struggle for truth. The starting point will be biographical link of both authors to history and at the end I will give some hints concerning a possible use of the concepts for today's theory discussions.

Introduction

The promise of Eternity is the revolutionary force in history. Losing order means to lose the relation between the (old) gods and your own history. History loses its sense if there is a gap between experience and expectation as well as between past and future. Doing historical research means to observe the reflection of the beginning and the End of history as a search for truth about both to close the gap of uncertainty.

Unfortunately, this is not a convincing compromise between two authors who share a lot of experiences and found different ways to conceptualize them. Therefore, this paper compares some of the experiences, concepts and aims of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Eric Voegelin. Additionally, it includes my own conclusions and I am aware that the first statement is in some kind Gnostic thinking because it assumes a similarity between eternity and the futures past.¹

Following Voegelin it is a form of hubris and an element of disorder to give a prognosis about the End of history, because a prognosis includes a statement about sense and direction. In his work he criticised any theory which pretends to know about the future as a kind of gnosis and therefore potentially totalitarian. On the contrary Rosenstock-Huessy analyzed the European Revolutions as a meaningful history with

¹ Koselleck 2004.
a start and an end. Besides, he based his assumptions on a dialogical theory based on the re- or disordering of the relation between expectations and experiences. Accordingly, there is no fix point where one can observe and analyze history from a place outside history. In other words: there is no chance for objectivity or positivism. That is one reason for Rosenstock-Huessy's criticism concerning historicism. He preferred to write an *Autobiography of Western Man*\(^2\) instead—including the change in reflection and construction of history in history. Whereas Rosenstock-Huessy based his history on the change of reflection, it was Voegelin who started to analyze the losing of reflection during the search for order in history. Nevertheless, they both had a lot in common:

"Both men were refugees from Hitler. Both rejected not only the behaviourist and positivist approaches to the human sciences that dominated American universities throughout the forties, fifties, and sixties, but the underlying humanist assumptions of the modern era. Both undertook their diagnosis of the pathologies of modernity by examining Western civilisation in its entirety. Both were amongst the genuine polymaths of the century. Both were to identify themselves as Christian thinkers. And while their writings often cut across similar territory, neither ever mentions the other."

Therefore, both philosophers are good examples for the fact that social science does not develop in some sort of esoteric processes (*Kuhn*) inside a scientific community but it is mostly linked with processes in society.\(^4\)

Jörn Rüsen and Horst Walter Blanke developed a disciplinary matrix of historiography that tried to combine *Kuhn's* theory of scientific revolutions with the influence of social life by selecting questions, concepts and themes. Rüsen makes a distinction between five factors of historiography and he shows that a change of a single factor may cause a domino effect on the whole range of the paradigm. These factors of the disciplinary matrix are arranged in a circle divided into two spheres: On the one hand a) the function of offering orientation in society and b) the cognitive interest of human being to have orientation in time belong to the sphere of social living; on the other hand c) the theories and ideas, d) the methods, and e) the forms of representation belong to the sphere of science.\(^5\)

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\(^2\) Rosenstock-Huessy 1993 [1938].
\(^3\) Cristaudo 1999: 58.
\(^4\) Kuhn 1962.
Even if this kind of social epistemology can be useful for analyzing paradigm shifts, as Horst Walter Blanke has shown, it is—in my eyes—important to stress that historiography itself is an institution that does not only provide orientation in time but, in doing so, it could be used as part of a political theology. A good example for the co-evolution of historical science and political theology is the German Historismus—mostly associated with Prussian historians like Heinrich Treitschke.

Therefore, I agree with Voegelin that there is a relationship between the history of ideas and history similar to the connection between the order of history and the history of order. Nevertheless, the search for an island of order in an age of disorder itself is—in my eyes—part of a construction of a serial history in the sense of Foucault.

He discovered that the construction of long cycles in the French social history of the Annales and the construction of sense in cultural history are two sides of one epistemic coin: history includes the promise of compensation of present losses in the future. Indeed, Fernand Braudel confessed in one of his autobiographical writings that he developed the concept of the longue durée as consolation during the dark days as a prisoner of war in Germany.

All in all, it is nearly impossible to make a distinction between the reflection of the crisis and the crisis itself because identity and reflection are both part of our consciousness.

II. History as autobiography

The reflection of the complex relationship between life and science is the base for historians to give orientation in past and present. Nevertheless, historiography is an institution that tries to minimize contingency in social life and offers political legitimacy. Therefore, biographies of historians play a key role in their research—even most historians tend to deny any influence of their biography on their work. This is not the case in the works of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Eric Voegelin, because

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6 Voegelin 2004: 27.
both authors tried to build up their theories on a reflection of this complex relation-
ship between time, man, institutions and world. In *Out of Revolution* Eugen Rosen-
stock-Huessy gives a good example for this kind of reflection, because he calls his
book an *Autobiography of Western Man*, and he reflects his position in contrast to
the philosophical tradition. The result of his historical reflection became the credo of
his metanomic thinking:

"The 'Cogito ergo sum' [Descartes, A.L.] for its rivalry with theology, was one-sided. We post-
War thinkers are less concerned with the reveal character of the true God or the true character of
nature than with the survival of a truly human society. In asking for a truly human society we
put the question of truth once more; but our specific endeavour is the living realization of truth
in mankind. Truth is divine and has been divinely revealed – credo ut intelligam [Anselm von
Canterbury, A.L.]. Truth is pure and can be scientifically stated – cogito ergo sum. Truth is vital
and must be socially represented – Respondeo etsi mutabor."  

This kind of autobiographical and dialogical thinking can be traced back to his
freshman-years. In 1906 Rosenstock-Huessy, who was born in 1888 in Berlin, de-
cided to convert from Judaism to Protestantism. This decision and the experiences of
World War I. are essential for understanding his work, because in most of his writ-
ings the search for dialog between different social and cultural groups and the rea-
sons for the disorder of the early 20th century play a key role.

In this nexus it should be mentioned that Rosenstock-Huessy not only thought about
peace but he also participated in many projects for adult education in Germany as
well as in the United States and, therefore, he theorized and practised dialogical
thinking on history and philosophy. The most important dialog, he participated in,
was an outcome of the *Patmos-Circle* and ended in an exchange of letters (and
more) with the Jewish Philosopher Franz Rosenzweig. Therefore, it was a program-
matic decision to choose a sentence of one of Rosenzweig's letters as the motto for a
later edition of his masterpiece *Die europäischen Revolutionen*:

"Es gibt im Leben alles Lebendigen Augenblicke oder vielleicht nur einen Augenblick, wo es
die Wahrheit spricht. Man braucht also vielleicht überhaupt nichts über das Lebendige zu sagen,
sondern man muß nur den Augenblick abpassen, wo es sich selber ausspricht. Den Dialog aus
diesen Monologen halte ich für die ganze Wahrheit. Franz Rosenzweig an den Verfasser 1916,
Briefe (1935), S. 712".  

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10 Rosenstock-Huessy 1952: S. IV. A translation could be: „There are moments or perhaps only one mo-
ment in the life of every living being where it speaks the truth. You don’t need to say anything about that
living being, you only need to wait for the moment, where it speaks for itself. In my opinion, this dialog
of monologues is the truth itself.” For the translation of the quotes and the correction of the draft I have to
thank Sebastian Knake.
Rosenstock-Huessy’s academic career began promising in the wake of world war one, but his experiences as an officer in the German army and his nervous breakdown during the battle of Verdun changed his career plans and his way of writing fundamentally. An altered orthography and circulars addressed to friends on certain dates in which he called himself “Knight of St. Georg” are expressions of his nervousness. Hermann Kantorowicz, the famous legal academic and husband of Rosenstock-Huessy’s sister Dorothea answered one of his “Georg-letters” admonishingly:

"Es ist immer die Klage Deiner Freunde gewesen, daß Du dich bewußt nach einer bestimmten Art stilisierst, sagen wir kurz, vom Jüdisch-Rationalen zum Deutsch-Mystischen hin. Ein solches Bestreben kann nichts Erfreuliches zu Wege bringen, ja Du musst selbst darunter leiden."\(^{11}\)

Werner Picht, the father of Georg Picht, was however enrapt by Rosenstock-Huessy’s interpretation of history, which was inherent even in his first drafts of his book *Die Europäischen Revolutionen*. Rosenstock-Huessy developed his interpretation of history in a dialogue with his reception of the present to a representation of world history. His own disastrous experiences left a mark on his body as well as on his work. Even the fall of the Weimar republic and the Second World War did not compare to this experience, since Rosenstock-Huessy left Germany for the USA shortly after Hitlers rise to power; a move that he did not experience as emigration. Although he continued his career in Harvard and at Dartmouth College and was visiting professor at different universities in Germany after the war, he did not have great success in the academic mainstream. But, there are some renowned scientists, who took notice of his works, for example Theodor Schieder, Reinhart Koselleck, Hans-Ulrich Wehler or Harold Berman.\(^{12}\)

In this regard, the impact of Voegelin’s work is slightly different—he was popular particularly within political science\(^{13}\)—but the selective reception of his work was similar to that of Rosenstock-Huessy. The reason may be that Christian intellectuals are not taken for granted in some parts of the modern academic systems. Especially

\(^{11}\) Archive of the Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Society, Bielefeld, "Georgsreden”, 5.3.4. A translation could be: “Your friends have always criticized your way of conventionalizing yourself as a German mystic rather than the, let’s say, jewish-rational man they know. This attempt can never work out well and it is you who will suffer most from it.” Leutzsch 2009: 54.


in Germany the Protestantism of the past was secularized into a rational criticism and (pseudo-)objectivity concerning religious or theological thinking. However, in the 1920s the thinking about theological roots of politics and polity was an important theme in German academic culture–even it wasn't mainstream as well.

After World War I. the discussion about the–so called–Historismus became more and more important and Rosenstock-Huessy was among those historians who tried to develop new theoretical views on history. Even in this time it is hard to tell what people really meant when they were talking about Historismus. But, all in all, it was quite evident that the traditional way of writing German history by emphasizing the Prussian mission was not an option anymore. In his work Die Europäischen Revolutionen Rosenstock-Huessy began to deal with European history and the most important political, ideological and social processes that were part of it. He left the container of the nation and opened a door to the universal history of Western civilization. Besides, to Rosenstock-Huessy it was the national paradigm of historiography that represented one of the most dangerous threads to peace in Europe and, therefore, he began to search for the core of identification. In his work and in the media he therefore distanced himself from the old national paradigm and tried to find some support from prominent or promising colleagues. Ironically, he chose Carl Schmitt–the later Crown Jurist of the Third Reich and opponent of Voegelin's teacher Hans Kelsen–for comments on his book and as his potential partner in science. Carl Schmitt made many notes about the book and discussed some parts critically but in 1933 he decided to join the NSDAP and began to legitimize crimes instead of fighting against them. However, both recognized the important power of language in history which is one of the keys to Rosenstock-Huessy's theory because change in speech is nothing less than an indicator for the change of belief and reflection.

At first, Rosenstock-Huessy defines revolution as a process of total change and therefore only a few world revolutions mark a period of time and create a new space. Altogether the world revolutions from the 9th to the 20th centuries are just one sin-

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14 During my research I noticed how fast people put you in a (Christian) box if you talk about Rosenstock-Huessy, Voegelin or Schmitt.
16 For ex.: Mehring 2009, Leutzsch 2009, 60.
gle process: the *circumvolution*. This process starts with the *papal revolution* and ends with the *world society*. Therefore, the circumvolution is a directed process with a beginning and an end.

Secondly, the actors of each revolution try to free the world from injustice but during the different phases of the revolutionary process—each phase may last for a couple of years or more than a century—the social and legal arrangements between the different actors limit the spatial dimensions of each revolution. In the core of this imagined world the revolutionaries establish a new nation with a new language, new rights and laws; and they empower new actors, institutions and create a new *Volk-scharakter*.

In my eyes it makes sense to translate this concept into more modern terms: It is the institutional setting of the new nation that becomes the core of the new world and defines a global standard of modernity. Additionally, these institutions will survive the forthcoming revolutions as long as they are able to minor contingency and do not contradict with new institutions. Therefore, persistence and change depend on compromises between different revolutionary periods each marked by a new language that defines the reality by the empowerment of institutions. Thus, the spatial (or structural) dimension of institutions is temporal as well.\(^\text{17}\)

Thirdly, the next revolution breaks out in the most backward part of the world. Therefore, the circumvolution—as the all-inclusive history of revolutions—is a dialectical process. Thus, Rosenstock-Huessy’s theory is not far from Hegel’s or Marx’s interpretation of world history, but his model differs, for ex., from the classics concerning the outbreak of the revolution in the most backward part of the world.

Rosenstock-Huessy uses different methods and sources to test his arguments. Analyzing the different centres of maps and seals he shows that every revolution establishes a new world view. Furthermore, his interpretation of the central manifests proofs the constitution of a global claim that every revolution rises in a new language.

Notwithstanding, his concept has several weaknesses. Good indicators for the problems are the changes in the design of his theory he made over the years. In his first\(^\text{17}\) Leutzsch 2009,
writings Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy developed a theory of institutional change and based his assumptions on the conceptual history of the term ‘Revolution’. But, in his first book about the European revolutions he analyzed the revolutionary change in the stratification and he focused his narration on the historical actors. Furthermore, in *Out of Revolution* he again changed the theory design and wrote an autobiography of mankind as a single process of revolutionary change and accumulation of institutions. On the one hand these changes are a good test for the diagnostic and prognostic character of his historical works, but on the other hand it shows that the dialectical model has its limits. Carl Schmitt criticized that Rosenstock-Huessy has not considered the revolutionary processes in Spain of the 16th century and Rosenstock-Huessy’s answers concerning this criticism were more or less of practical but not of conceptual nature. It is telling that Fernand Braudel developed his theory of long lasting structural change just for this period of time.

Summing up, Rosenstock-Huessy's theory of revolutions combines analyzes of immanent and transcendent processes to show that total revolution is a process of trajectory realization and progressive action. He argues (like Spengler) that from the Papal until the French Revolution the aim of the revolutionaries was the reconstitution of a lost order. On the contrary, the *French* and the *Russian revolution* had a progressive and prognostic character including a new telos of history and a new imagination of order. Rosenstock-Huessy shows the change in the world view with a Conceptual history of the term Revolution. In so doing he was one of the first historians who developed a Conceptual history. Therefore, Rosenstock-Huessy belongs to the fathers of Conceptual history which is based on the assumption that the Age of Enlightenment and French Revolution was the Sattelzeit (Koselleck) of the invention and change in meaning of political and social terms. The progressive and prognostic character of modern political terms is their signature. Voegelin is not far away from this position, because he also stresses the conservative character of premodern revolutions. In his eyes there is a deep gap between the American and French revolution. The eschatological character of modern ideologies is his leading view on history.

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18 Leutzsch 2009: 54.
19 Leutzsch 2009, 105-106.
Living in an Age of Political Theologies

Voegelin developed his concept of gnosis from his political theory, which was first manifested in his work Die politischen Religionen—a book he wrote on the eve of his flight from Vienna. In this work he debunked modern ideologies as being pseudo-religious. He illustrates their turn towards immanence and the translation of the salvation history into a political program that was shaped for the here and now and that turned Man into his own creator. It is striking that Voegelin focuses on the secularization of Symbols which bridge the gap between the immanent and the transcendent and that they are misused for legitimizing disorder, because here we can find some parallels to Rosenstock-Huessy and even to Marx: Both recognize the use of past symbols—for example the establishment of historical relationships and pedigrees to legitimate themselves as being the heirs or fulfiller of history—as elements of a political theology. To give an example: During the campaign and during the first weeks in command President Obama used the same techniques to get acceptance and legitimacy. He has drawn a line from Lincoln's inauguration tour through Roosevelt's kitchen garden and Kennedy's Berlin Speech to his (charismatic) leadership. Charismatic domination is typical for times of crisis—it is the revolutionary power in history—and Max Weber was one of the first sociologists who developed a modern typology of domination and a precise definition of charismatic power. He was very influential for Voegelin's thinking about doing science and the same could be told about those academics who thought about political theology. In Voegelin's eyes the state, politics and policy should not be reduced on rational decision-making based on formal laws and institutions like Kelsen thought.

Another reference that arises out of his discussion with his teacher Kelsen is that to Carl Schmitt, who developed his political theology in the beginning of the 1920s. The major difference between Schmitt and Voegelin is Schmitt’s focus on the state of emergency, which he put at the center of his theory and his fatal political en-

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22 Voegelin 2000 [1938].
Voegelin went in the opposite direction: his dedication and theory favor the good state over the ideal and thus potentially totalitarian one. In all his works he struggled for political thinking without an immanent telos. Later he changed his concept of political religions into the one of gnosis—a term used to denominate sects of early Christianity.

He developed this concept in different publications and he used it for his masterpiece *Order and History* to characterize the ideologies which do not differ between the spheres of transcendence and immanence strictly.

As early as in his work *The New Science of Politics* and focussing on the history of ideas from Joachim von Fiore to Hegel, Marx and finally Hitler Voegelin developed a typology of gnosis:

1. History is divided in three successive Ages
2. The use of the symbol of the leader
3. The presence of prophets of the new age, who predict the future by Gnostic speculation or revelation
4. Brotherhoods of autonomous people and the abolition of institutions

Thus, history gains an immanent meaning and the unknown future has been pulled into the present. The realm of experience and the horizon of expectations begin to intertwine.

Voegelin uses his concept in such a consequent way that there—at least—seems no difference between liberalism, fascism and communism. Additionally, all these ideologies include a telos and, therefore, might pretend that man can find salvation at the End of (immanent) history. Thus, the modern age belongs to the Gnostic periods in history. This kind of characterization of the modern age raises different questions: At first: Is the modern age another axial time? Secondly: Don't we need a differentiation of liberalism, socialism and fascism?

However, it is Voegelin's point that all these ideologies have one thing in common: the deformation of order. On the one hand manifested through the secularization of

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28 In sense of Jaspers and Eisenstadt.
transcendence and, on the other hand, represented by the (re-)divinization of the world (including the aim of a heaven on earth–an empire of freedom).\textsuperscript{30}

Voeglin tries to counter this development by conceptualizing political science as a science of order. He begins his thesis \textit{Anamnesis} with a programmatic appeal: "Die Probleme menschlicher Ordnung in Gesellschaft und Geschichte entspringen der Ordnung des Bewußtseins. Die Philosophie des Bewußtseins ist daher das Kernstück der Politik".\textsuperscript{31}

Voegelin’s project–the quest for order–is characterized by his idea of a connection between the history of consciousness and the history of order and the linear evolution of these intertwined histories. Voegelin sees himself as a \textit{guardian of institutions} and can in part be compared to Carl Schmitt, who understands himself as a sentinel–the \textit{Katechon}–of the old order. Additionally, Schmitt shared Voegelin's critical position concerning the change from transcendent into immanent imaginations in the public discourse.\textsuperscript{32}

From a new-institutionalist perspective one could argue against Voegelin that he acts under the assumption that a) there are always similar social systems of organization, b) disorder and deformation are indicators for the failing of institutions, c) man changes over time. In short: discourse, institutions and actors are subject to historic change, a fact that is to be recognized by any theoretic approach in history. If institutions are overburdened by an increase of contingency then the realm of experience and the horizon of expectations diverge.

This widening gap between utopian promise and the realm of experience produces a new man, new institutions and a new language. Rosenstock-Huessy was aware of this phenomenon and–like Schmitt–researched about the consequential change of terms and symbols.

Rosenstock-Huessy and Voegelin understand the shift of \textit{time series} (Foucault) but, in contrast to Rosenstock-Huessy, Voegelin insists on the unchanging man. Voegelin admits the material improvement that came along with modernity, but at the

\textsuperscript{30} Henkel 2009: 109-115.
\textsuperscript{31} Voegelin 1966: 7.
\textsuperscript{32} Carl Schmitt 2009 [1922].
same time blames it for the decay of spirit that was caused by man replacing god with himself.

**Metanoia or Metaxy?**

Following Rosenstock-Huessy, Odilo—the famous fifth abbot of Cluny—established a new world view by introducing the pray for all souls and paved the way for the recuperation of clerical independence in the beginning of the world history. Between the 10th and 20th century the historical process is a *circumvolution* of revolutions. In sum, Rosenstock-Huessy started to analyze world history with an intern-extern perspective and he turns this perspective upside down reaching the presence. This perspective turn is also a programmatic one, because in his opinion the future defines the past and the past legitimates the social construction of space. Finally, it is the future—in the sense of prognostic, desires and fears—which constructs our past and configures our discourse and actions. At the End of history the rational language of economy—the language of charts and figures—and the progress as well as the interdependence in science, warfare and economy empower institutions and force the actors to appease.

Nevertheless, in my eyes this does not mean the end of all wars, but these wars are just part of the last revolution and they are waged between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ actors concerning their institutions and empowerment. That is the reason why we are used to camouflage armies as peacekeeping forces, the western world is on war against the war, in Germany Ministers of War are called Ministers of Defence and the US government decided (1973) to decorate wounded or killed members of peacekeeping forces with the Purple Heart.

In the past—which is the world history—the actors in the most backward parts of the world each established a new world view leading to modernity and to a new core of the political globe, but these globalizing processes came to an end and now we are living in a world of intern processes and our map—the map of the UN—has no centre anymore.

We have seen that in the European revolutions the actors empower a new language and create a new space: the nation. Therefore, language includes a new World view
in spatial and temporal dimensions and it could make distinctions between us and them, modernity and tradition or modern man and barbarians. Wayne Cristaudo gives a good interpretation of Rosenstock-Huessy's ideas about names and concepts:

"Very briefly, he argues that the intellectual life of nations, and the professions which give us social orientation, are responses to the universe seeking its own enhancement through the distribution of tasks and activities which have a grammatical underpinning. Thus, deploying the quadrilateral matrix [the Cross of Reality, A.L.] necessary for correctly observing any social reality, he argues that our experiences will be accumulated and devolved through these spatial/temporal grammatical modules so that: 'the subjunctive of grammar, in the life of a great nation, is represented by music, by poetry, by all the arts. The equations of our calculating logic are spread out in all the sciences and techniques. The trajective, linking us with the living past, lives in us through all the traditions. The prejective is represented by prophecy, ethics, programmatic movements (1970a, 187)."³³

The driving force behind Rosenstock-Huessy's dialog philosophy is more or less the same like the one in his practical social projects, because the aim of his metanomical theory is to connect the trinity of temporal structures with the reflection of spatial constructions. He therefore understands his concept as a way to reflect processes of social and cultural in- and exclusion. In my eyes, metanomics is a kind of deconstruction of concepts and names, which were empowered by ideologies including a telos. To sum up, his theory postulates that the reconstruction of the past is based on the construction of the future. He stresses the creative force of revolutions, but in Voegelin's mind revolutions are the disordering and evil power in history:

"To Voegelin, revolutions are symbolic expressions of the derangements and deformities of humanity. They are a consequence of existential hubris, and an indication for how far we have strayed from the proper order of existence. His writings on politics are a sustained warning against the dangers of revolution as well as a diagnosis and an anatomy of the states of mind that he sees as the factors that are giving rise to it."³⁴

Cristaudo compares Voegelin's horror of revolutions and Gnosticism with Rosenstock-Huessy's more distant understanding of revolutions as driving forces of progress in a very convincing way. He stresses that Rosenstock-Huessy's theory of revolutions must come perilously close to Gnosticism in Voegelin's eyes.³⁵ Additionally, he characterizes the difference between the concepts as based on a different way of understanding philosophy and normative thinking and sums up:

"The differences between Voegelin's and Rosenstock-Huessy's assessment of revolution are, then, indicative of two approaches to reality, which stem from the one's acceptance of the adequacy of the language of philosophy and its symbols to understand order and history, and the other's insistence that speech and action cannot narrowly contained within the conception of order and the stock symbols of the philosophical consciousness. The respective assessments of

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³³ Cristaudo 2010.
³⁴ Cristaudo 1999: 58.
³⁵ Cristaudo 1999: 59.
philosophy are themselves indicative of a fundamental division about the meaning and contribution of Christianity to Western civilisation.\textsuperscript{36}

But, there is another reason for the deep gap between the two concepts. Voegelin's concept auf consciousness is elaborated and complex but it provides only little information about the historical reflection of time. The whole project is set to conceptualize the development of ideas and ideologies as a driving force to understand or manipulate history; it doesn't really give a chance to speak about the present because in Voegelin's theory the present is linked with eternity and the transcendental belief in salvation and god.

While Rosenstock-Huessy started to construct the dynamic entanglement of time structures, it was Voegelin who started to reconstruct reflection in the way a ladder man has to climb between present and eternity. That may be the way out of Plato's Cave but without a periagoge to the fellow men. Even it is in somehow a kind of elitist thinking similar to Plato's time; it shows our alienation from eternity but also from time at all (for example the shrinking of time in space or between generations).

Therefore, both authors started to think about an \textit{In-between-Being}. In the case of Voegelin this concept plays a key role for the reconstruction of the \textit{leap} on being between \textit{It-} and \textit{Thing reality}–the immanent and transcendent world. Man should participate in both worlds as an existence \textit{In-between} and he should learn to differ between them in a community of God, Man, World and Society. Rosenstock-Huessy thinks more dialogical\textsuperscript{37} between the different modes of time. Additionally, he calls us to search for the dialog between different spaces and to keep on learning from each other. I guess, there is a slight difference between both concepts, because Voegelin's being In-between is a rather static position like that of a \textit{katechon} (Schmitt) whereas Rosenstock's concept of a metanomic of society is a more dynamic concept.

Therefore, there is another difference between both philosophers: On the one hand Voegelin's concept of consciousness derives from a picture of anthropological eternity and on the other hand Rosenstock-Huessy believes in the multiformaty of Man as a signature of history:

\textsuperscript{36} Christaudo 1999: 59.
\textsuperscript{37} Klenk 2003.
"Human history tells the tale of a free man’s reproduction. The everlasting man is always free and always a son, always a heir and always an innovator. That is expressed in the syllable ›re‹ in revolution. […] The syllable ›re‹ signifies that his action implies selection. The riddles of our human existence lie in the fact that we are reproducing a changeable kind.”

Conclusion

Eric Voegelin and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy were looking for truth in the Age of Extremes – an Age of Totalitarianism, Revolution and Disorder. In some eyes God died during this period of time and Demigods were born. Both Philosophers searched for order in History and they found Disorder and Revolution instead.

Max Weber—a reference both authors shared—explained that charismatic leadership is the revolutionary power in history. Charismatic domination is based on a permanent crisis and the charismatic leader seems to have the key to solve all problems that people have to face. The charismatic leader maintains legitimacy for his domination as long as he has the ability to find a response to any challenge. In some cases this kind of regime finds a way to create a kind of traditional or rational domination—in other cases it loses its legitimacy because of failure or it declines. Examples for charismatic domination could be found in medieval as well as in modern times. In German history Otto von Bismarck and Adolf Hitler are examples for charismatic domination but they also represent a mixture of Weber’s ideal types of domination.

Nevertheless, the search for a myth, a tradition or a pedigree characterized especially the leaders of the Third Reich; it was their—in some sense traditional—response to the challenge of legitimacy. In my eyes this is a good example for the need for images of an order with a past and a future. Demigods neither belong to man’s history nor to god’s eternity and they live between the worlds and times—they are personalized symbols for heaven on earth but mostly they create hell instead of paradise.

This struggle for immanent recognition seems to be a response to another human hurt (Kränkung) in the sense of Freud—after losing the dominant position in nature (Darwin), universe (Kopernikus, Galilei, Keppler), and his freedom of consciousness (Freud) man lost god (Nietzsche) by making god in their own image.

38 Rosenstock-Huessy 1938: 735.
39 Weber 1980 [1922].
40 Leutzsch 2009b.
This is truly a question of political theology and it is an indicator for the importance of changes in world views. In a wider sense Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy discussed the relationship between reality and its description. Consequently, he wrote an autobiography of mankind consisting of world events and ending in world society.41

Whereas Rosenstock-Huessy tried to give man's experiences and history a structure, Voegelin attempted to reconstruct history as a search for order between experience and eternity. They have in common that their projects were stimulated by the insight in history they got from their own experiences in Germany and Austria during the crises after World War I. and on the Eve of World War II. Therefore, it is not surprising that both developed a theory of disorder and that they criticized the academic establishment for being caught in a historicist or positivist world view. Additionally, they both developed a theory of mediation between the threefold of time.

In contrast to this disorder, traditional and rational regimes found a way to create an order of history that consists of a steady and shared relation between history as a continuity of events and eternity as continuity without a beginning and an end. Eternity in this sense can be a special political theology or the share of power based on the empowerment of universal values. In both cases the relation between the eternity of god—or any other moral institution—and the current regime builds on a distinction between world and the other world for which people search and wait. In the case of traditional domination—for example—the pedigree represents the history of the dynasty but the scarification is based on a special relationship to god symbolized through healing hands or the king's second body. It is not an accident that Marc Bloch42 and Ernst Kantorowicz43 wrote or developed their first ideas about political theology in a time in which charismatic demigods—lacking a special relation to the eternity of god or universal norms—were born on Earth. The same could be said about the work of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Eric Voegelin.

During his whole life, and especially after he had to leave Vienna because of Austria's Anschluss in 1938, Voegelin fought against totalitarian ideologies and for peace. I guess that this is one of the most important parallels between both philoso-
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Phers, because it was nearly the same historical experience that made them think about gnosis, revolution, time, and space. Besides, they both had their cultural background of Germany and had to start again in the United States. In some aspects the German academic culture that died during or after the Third Reich kept on living in both authors. Good examples are the books they read and the circles they felt sympathy for.

In his *Autobiographische Reflexionen* Voegelin discusses the universal historians Oswald Spengler and Eduard Meyer with some sympathy. Oswald Spengler’s morphology and Eduard Meyer’s cyclical thinking are good examples for the negation of progress in history and it is striking that Voegelin chooses Weber, Spengler and Meyer for examples of comparative history. The same could be told about his positive assessment of Stefan George and his circle and it is irritating that he speaks about people who circled around a charismatic Prophet with such a grace. Even if he had no clue about the *Arcanum* of the *Secret Germany* it shows that his pessimistic view of the modern times drew on his reading experiences as a freshman as well.

However, it is not necessary to draw a direct line between the conservative revolution and fascism or Hitler’s zoology, but it must be said that neither their postulated *ideal nation* nor Platon’s *polis* were democratic ones in the sense of the French Revolution. Maybe it is carrying things too far to say that Voegelin tried to put aside the Devil with the Beelzebub or that he has chosen Mephisto to criticize Faust (like Schmitt did) but it is remarkable that he nearly ignored the revolutionary potential of conservatism and the social question of living standards and deprivation. Rosenstock-Huessy, who read the same authors, came to a different conclusion:

"From the facts of our World War experience we must draw the inevitable conclusion: property, or in other words, the endless production of goods, is certainly an endeavour which can unite mankind in its struggle for life all over the world."46

This statement concerning the future shows that Rosenstock-Huessy analyzes history from a prognostic position and Berman is right when he says that:

"Rosenstock-Huessy was a prophet who, like many great prophets, failed in his own time, but whose time may now be coming."47

44 Karlauf 2008.
47 Berman 1993: xviii.
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