

◆Entzauberung◆, Secularization, 'Umbesetzung', Immanentization

A Short Comparative Analysis of Voegelin's Concept of ◆Immanentization◆ ◆

Copyright 2001 Govert Buijs

E-mail: g.j.buijs@ph.vu.nl

Draft in progress (not to be quoted)

Written in a language somewhat similar to English.

The language is not yet corrected by a native speaker!

Introduction

One of the key concepts in Voegelin's *The New Science of Politics* is the concept of immanentization. At first sight the concept has a clear meaning. Strictly spoken it refers to a process in which that what formerly was ◆transcendent◆ has become or is becoming ◆immanent◆. But beyond this very short explication of the term, problems arise. One becomes especially aware of these problems when comparing the phrase to similar phrases that seem to refer to the very same process, but that seem to suggest different interpretations of the process.

There is indeed extant a family of important concepts, that seem to refer to the very same process, the modern loss of a transcendent referent for this world. One can think of concepts like ◆Entzauberung◆ (Max Weber), ◆secularisation◆ (one of the thinkers using this concept in political theory has been Carl Schmitt, and in the philosophy of history it has been used by Karl L◆with) and ◆Umbesetzung◆ (Hans Blumenberg). In this paper I will undertake an effort to get more clarity about the specific contribution of Voegelin's concept of ◆immanentization◆ by comparing it to some of these other ◆familiar◆ concepts.

Some of the key problems surrounding all these terms can be pointed out immediately. To mention a few: do they refer to specific historic periods, so that one can speak of a ◆secularized◆ or ◆immanentized◆ age? Or do they refer to an option that is *semper et ubique*, always and everywhere, open for people (provided that there is still any ◆god-talk◆ around, or even more vaguely: provided that there is still some awareness of a dimension other than what catches the eye)? Do they refer to collective processes or primarily to a process in individual human souls? Do they refer to a change of meaning that befalls certain specific ideas, or specific symbols, or specific images (perhaps so specific that one can trace them to one corpus of writings and/or one author, as L◆with and Voegelin claim is the case with Joachim of Fiore?). As the concepts try to establish in one phrase both a certain continuity and a certain discontinuity the question arises where the continuity and where the discontinuity is to be established. And what will deserve the greatest attention and will be stressed most emphatically,

the continuity or the discontinuity? Do the concepts refer to a loss, to a replacement or substitution (Ersatz) or to something new in its own right?

The aim of this paper is very limited. I intend to undertake a first and still very sketchy attempt to get a clearer picture of Voegelin's concept of immanentization by comparing and contrasting it to the other concepts mentioned. The paper as it is, is meant to be a starting point for discussion and further clarification.

Secularization: a brief historical note

Strictly spoken, the concept of secularization is the oldest concept of the ones mentioned. Rumor has it that it had been invented by the French diplomat Longueville during the negotiations that led up to the Peace of West-Phalia in the 17th century. Here the concept was used to give a semblance of legitimacy to the use of church property as a means of compensating the Elector of Brandenburg for the loss of his territory to Sweden. The land was not taken from the church, but was secularized which as a matter of fact meant the very same thing but had a more acceptable and legitimate ring to it. The term later became the official legal term for withdrawing church property from the church and giving it to the state or any other worldly institution.

In the years up to the French Revolution and later in the 19th century the phrase acquired a somewhat programmatic meaning: secularization become a goal to be achieved for enlightened people. The church had to get rid of its worldly properties and its worldly influence. On the European continent the word then gets more and more abstract socio-cultural overtones: society and culture had to be secularized (or from the opposite camp: the secularization of society and culture had to be prevented), which meant: the influence of church and religion had to be diminished. World and life had to be seen, experienced and lived from a naturalistic point of view without reference to anything supernatural.

In the Anglo-Saxon world where the relations between State and Church had been quite different from those on the Continent the word secular seems to have been introduced right away as a concept to denote a certain worldview. In 1846 George Jacob Holyoake founded the Londoner Secular Society and he published in 1854 a book titled *Secularism. The Practical Philosophy of the People*. It was, as he himself wrote later on, a new name for a new thing. It was a plea for taking secular things as secular and therefore cutting them loose from church and religion. Especially his plea for secular schools was noteworthy.

So initially the concept of **secularization** has not been a scientific concept, used to analyze certain phenomena in reality, but a political and a legal concept, used to create new states of affairs (new relations of property) and still later on it became a concept to promote a certain specific **secular** worldview.

In the order of time, of the four concepts mentioned in the Introduction, this leaves Weber's **Entzauberung** as the first scientific concept.

Entzauberung (Weber)

Initially, Weber's concept of **Entzauberung** has not drawn the attention it deserved. An indication of this lack of attention might be that Talcott Parsons in his translation of *The Protestant Ethic* did not search for a technical term that would have rendered the Weberian phrase as exactly as possible like **disenchantment** but uses the more general and explanatory phrase **the elimination of magic**. As a matter of fact the concept does not occur very often in Weber's work. The essay on **The Protestant Ethic** has the phrase only three times, although Protestantism (i.c. Calvinism, i.c. Puritanism) for Weber has been the most important carrier of the process in modern times.

However, the term becomes particularly prominent in Weber's late essay on **Science as a Vocation** (1917/1919). Here the phrase is used as an attempt to describe the essential characteristic of the predicament of modernity. It is indissolubly tied to that other famous phrase of Weber's, the rationalization of the world. Rationalization and disenchantment almost are synonyms for Weber. However, of these two the concept of disenchantment specifically refers to the irreversible losses of the process of rationalization.

The great loss that Weber is referring to is the rift between the two worlds of **Sein** and **Sollen**, or in a somewhat different fashion between the world of **means** and the world of **ends**, or in a still somewhat different fashion the world of **thinking** and the world of **willing** or **choosing**.

Through the process of rationalization it has become impossible to make rational decisions about the ultimate goals in life. The unity of life, which had been achieved in the great world religions, but especially in Christianity, is lost. The great religions had succeeded in making the meaning of life a matter of public knowledge (not individual choice) and the prescribed means of achieving this meaning were as well a matter of public knowledge and hence by definition rational.

In the rationalization processes however the means are becoming more and more prominent over against the ends or goals. The spheres of politics and of economics are among the most important **spheres of means** that are cut loose from any overriding, otherworldly goals. They **come into their own** more and more, developing their own rationality. Moreover, these spheres are determining public life more and more. So at the end of the day the great historical religions (and

philosophy) lose their public relevance, and the only thing relevant left in public life is (instrumental) rationality. Society as a whole therefore becomes more and more dominated by rational forms of organization i.e. by bureaucracy (Weber is using here the notorious metaphor of the 'iron cage').

However, on an individual level the religious way of life might still be an option. This option however can only be based on an individual choice, without any assistance of reason, for reason has withdrawn from the sphere of individual life choices.

So the disenchantment for Weber has at least the following implications:

the loss of public relevance of the world religions

the loss of unity of life and the development of different and separate spheres of life, each with its own, mutually incompatible way of life. The world becomes an arena of contesting forces.

the necessity for the individual to make choices unassisted by rationality.

Weber's often-quoted words are still worth quoting once again:

'Heute aber ist religiöser Alltag. Die alten vielen Götter, entzaubert und daher in Gestalt unpersönlicher Mächte, entstiegen ihre Größen, streben nach Gewalt über unser Leben und beginnen untereinander wieder ihren ewigen Kampf.'

In 'Science as a Vocation' Weber seems to analyze the 'disenchantment' indeed as a collective process from which it is impossible to withdraw individually. Or to be more precise: it is possible to withdraw from the 'disenchantment' but at the very same time one will become totally irrelevant in public life. So at the end of the day there are only two options for Weber: either one becomes a politician (publicly relevant, but obliged to adhere to the 'values' of political organization, to the values of rational bureaucracy) or one becomes a world-averting mystic (who is just not up to everyday life and therefore is a publicly utterly irrelevant figure).

The consequences are spelled out dramatically by Weber: Everyone has to decide all by himself who he is going to be. Everyone has to choose between 'God' and 'devil', however, 'your devil might be my God and my God might be your devil'. There is no publicly available rational measure of man left.

'Secularization' (Schmitt)

'Alle prägnanten Begriffe der modernen Staatslehre sind sekularisierte theologische Begriffe', is the famous opening sentence of the third chapter of Carl Schmitt's *Politische Theologie* (1922). 'All meaningful concepts of modern political theory /theory of the state are

secularized theological concepts. For Schmitt this 'secularization is not only or merely a matter of historical derivation, but a matter of the systematic structure of the concepts.

The third chapter that itself is called also *Politische Theologie* is not a clear cut exposition and explanation of the opening sentence. What Schmitt actually gives in this chapter is more like a *method*, a way to proceed in the *sociology of law*. In order to understand the dominant political and legal concepts of an age, one should relate these concepts to the dominant metaphysics of that age. Why some political or legal concepts are almost self-evident in a certain age but are experienced as strange and abstruse in an other age can only become understandable against the background of the dominant metaphysics of that age. For example: the monarch fulfills in the legal theory of the 17th century the same function as God in the Cartesian world-system. And in the modern concept of sovereignty the divine attribute of omnipotence is transferred to the state or to the political sovereign.

A more elaborate exposition of his analysis of the Western secularization process Schmitt has given in his essay on *Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen* that is the second part of his *Der Begriff des Politischen* (version 1932). Here Schmitt uses the conception of a *central sphere* (*Zentralgebiet*), which is the sphere of life that shapes the basic perspective of the dominant elites in a society in a given age. For all the major problems in a society in that age the solution will be sought in a direction that is given with this basic perspective. Problems of other spheres of life become secondary. The *humanitarian-ethical* perspective of the dominant elites in the 18th century render the vexing theological and metaphysical problems of the 16th and 17th century obsolete. And the economical perspective of the 19th century have the same result regarding ethics. And the technical perspective of the 20th century renders everything else obsolete: all problems become technical problems, for which technical solutions have to be found. However, the authority of every central sphere is for Schmitt essentially *religious*: one can speak of a *religion of economics* and a *religion of technicism* etc.

For Schmitt however, the stakes are much higher than a mere exercise in the historical sociology of legal concepts. By relating metaphysical and legal concepts (in a given period), it can be showed that the legal concepts actually reflect a specific way of seeing the world, or more specific: a program of organizing the world in a certain way. And in this program certain aspects of the world, as they were experienced until that moment, are suppressed. So the question then becomes; what has become of these aspects? Are they simply erased? Or are they still present in a metamorphosed way?

So among the questions that Schmitt is asking are the following:

What has become in the *eternal dialogue* that is democracy of the former distinction between good and evil (Schmitt has spoken contemptuously of the Weimar-democracy as that political order that would respond to the question *Jesus of Bar-Abbas* by starting a debating group about the matter).

What has become of the power of the sovereign to decide about the legitimacy of the political order? Where rests this decision-power now ultimately?

What has become of the transcendence of God over against the world and parallel with that of the transcendence of the sovereign over against the people? Or has the people become co-extensive with itself and has it become its own sovereign? Is the people always right then?

What makes a political order a legitimate order in the pre-modern and in the modern situation?

So Schmitt's method of analyzing legal (and political) concepts as expressions of a hidden metaphysics becomes a first step in the critique of these concepts. The secularization paradigm is a means of revealing the highly ambiguous and risky character of the new in the light of the old. It is indeed a polemical strategy of questioning the legitimacy of the new.

Schmitt's analyses confine themselves strictly to the level of the history of ideas. Schmitt does not attempt to find a measure with which to judge the old as well as the new. He allows himself only to describe the historical developments

Apparently there is for Schmitt no outside of the historical processes. Apparently, at the end of the day as a political theorist one has to submit to history. There is no means of establishing the truth of a given political order.

And yet this is not the last word about the enigmatic figure of Carl Schmitt (provided such a last word is ever possible!). For why is he engaged in his at the same time polemical and submitting critique of the modern political constellation? In the background of Schmitt's writings there looms a deep awareness of some orthodox-Christian dogmas, especially the dogma of original sin. Schmitt simply does not believe that a world of eternal peace is possible, where Alle Menschen werden Brüder and where the distinction between good and evil has become obsolete.

Umbesetzung (Blumenberg)

Hans Blumenberg's *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* is a fierce attack on the whole class of concepts that we are dealing with in this paper. For him they are Kategorien des geschichtlichen Unrechts. Blumenberg's most important objection is that phrases like secularization, Verweltlichung, modern Gnosticism etc. do not take modernity for what it is in itself, but from the outset analyze modernity in terms of something else, something which it is not or is not anymore. From the outset in these phrases modernity appears as something derivative, inauthentic and hence illegitimate. So the phrases undermine the legitimacy of the modern age (Legitimität der Neuzeit).

Important sparring partners in this respect for Blumenberg are Carl Schmitt, Karl Löwith and (especially in the beginning of the second volume of *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit*, although mentioned only once in a footnote) also Eric Voegelin.

The first volume of *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* deals with a number of quite different possible forms of the secularization thesis. And every time Blumenberg's conclusion is similar. The truth of the secularization is in most cases merely a linguistic matter, through which a semblance of continuity is used to suppress deeper and more fundamental discontinuities.

Blumenberg gives a wealth of examples of the secularization thesis, as they can be found in very different types of literature: the modern search for scientific certainty as a secularization of the search for the certainty of salvation in Christianity; the modern work ethic as a secularized monastic asceticism; the Dandy as a secularized Christian saint; the radical self-reflective subjectivism in modern literature as a secularization of the Pietist and Puritan self-experience; the political equality of citizens before the law as the secularization of the equality of all mankind before God etc. etc.

So einfach ist, scheint es, die Substanz in ihren Metamorphosen zu identifizieren, und so leicht reihen sich die Metastasen des einen Ursprungs aneinander, wenn man das Rezept einmal gefunden hat. (p. 22)

Among the specific forms of the secularization thesis that Blumenberg is investigating at length are

Secularization as a means of revealing a meaning of modernity that otherwise remains hidden to itself: a hermeneutic function (Gadamer).

Modernity as unthinkable without Christianity (39vv)

The modern consciousness of history as a secularization of the Christian salvation history (Lwith).

Modern political theory as secularized Christian theology (Schmitt)

Of course it becomes a question of the first magnitude for Blumenberg how it is possible that the whole theme of secularization and all the more specified instances of it come up again and again. Where smoke is, there has to be a fire somewhere. So what is the fire that produces time and again the smoke of the secularization-theses?

To get hold of this problem Blumenberg coins his phrase of *Umbesetzung* (and therewith actually comes close to formulating his own version of the secularization thesis). Formulated in the most abstract manner, for Blumenberg there is no continuity of substance between Christianity and modernity but there is however a functional continuity. There is a continuity of questions that man asks about the world and about himself in the world. In an earlier age, Christianity filled in all the answers to the questions. However, due to a crisis in late medieval Christianity the given answers lost their plausibility (to use a famous term of Peter Berger). The answers to the questions became vacant places. These vacancies had to be filled, just as Christianity had filled them in an earlier age, when still earlier answers had lost their credibility. So modernity, in particular modern scientific thinking, had to fulfill the same *function*: providing answers to man's basic questions. The vacant places had to be refilled. But this does not imply

that the new answers are *substantially* dependent upon the old answers. They stand on their own feet. For the process of ◊refilling vacancies◊ Blumenberg uses the phrase ◊Umbesetzung◊.

Was in dem als S◊kularisierung gedeuteten Vorgang ◊berwiegend, jedenfalls bisher mit nur wenigen erkennbaren und spezifischen Ausnahmen, geschehen ist, l◊sst sich nicht als *Umsetzung* authentisch theologischer Gehalte in ihre s◊kulare Selbstentfremdung, sondern als *Umbesetzung* vakant gewordener Positionen van Antworten beschreiben, deren zugeh◊rige Fragen nicht eliminiert werden konnten. (75)

However, Blumenberg does not elaborate extensively on the source of these questions Why is it that man experiences the world as questionable?

Immanentization (Voegelin)

The concept of 'immanentization' is a very prominent concept in Voegelin's early work up to *The New Science of Politics* (1952), but much less in his later writings (I will come back to that). Already in the race-books the substance of the concept is very much present. In *Rasse und Staat* (1933) the modern state is analyzed as an immanent particularization of the universal transcendent *corpus mysticum*. And in *Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte* (1933) a very prominent concept is that of 'Verinnerlichung' which can be read as an exact synonym of 'immanentization', for it refers to a process in which the human body and the human person are cut loose from either a divine origin or a divine destiny. In the 18th century, long before Darwin, man came to be seen as the product of a natural, organic process ('Verinnerlichung des Leibes', pp. 80-127). And in the 19th century the view became prominent that the human destiny is not to be found in a transcendent realm, but has to be realized here and now on earth ('Verinnerlichung der Person', pp. 128-160). In this life the full human life can be lived (Goethe was often cited as concrete proof of this view).

Another formulation is to be found *Die politischen Religionen* (1938). Here Voegelin claims that some of the key concepts of the modern idea of the state presuppose the 'beheading of God' ('das gottliche Haupt wird abgeschlagen'). This has the fateful consequence that the political sphere becomes loaded with absolute oppositions between (immanent) divine empires and (immanent) evil empires. The political community becomes an immanently closed entity. So the religious impulse of man does not withdraw from the public sphere and is therefore not somehow lost (as Weber's 'Entzauberung' seemed to imply), but it is redirected toward another object.

'(W)enn Gott hinter der Welt unsichtbar geworden ist, dann werden die Inhalte der Welt zu neuen G◊ttern; wenn die Symbole der ◊berweltliche Religiosit◊t verbannt werden, treten neue, aus der innerweltlichen Wissenschaftssprache entwickelte Symbole an ihre Stelle.' (PR, 50v)

In *The New Science of Politics* the term immanentization is used as a key tool for analyzing the course of western civilization. Voegelin here speaks of 'two phases of immanentization'. The first phase is still within the orbit of the Christian faith and is marked by the speculations of Joachim

of Fiore and his break with the Augustinian symbolism of the two cities or two realms. 'The Joachitic speculation was an attempt to endow the immanent course of history with a meaning that was not provided in the Augustinian conception.' (*NSP*, 119). The second phase of immanentization is called by Voegelin 'secularization'. It is marked by the 18th century idea of progress.

In the relevant pages (119-132) the concept of 'immanentization' already has the following shades of meaning: treating symbols of faith as propositions concerning objects of immanent experience (*NSP*, 120). It is 'fallacious' (*NSP*, 120). It has a 'psychological' drive, the longing for absolute certainty and the overcoming of existential anxiety (*NSP*, 122). The 'drive' has another aspect as well, for Voegelin uses the phrase 'lust for massively possessive experience' (*NSP*, 123). It is 'an attempt at bringing our knowledge of transcendence into a firmer grip than the *cognitio fidei*, the cognition of faith, will afford' (*NSP*, 124). And the certainty gained carries with it the promise of salvific meaning, it is an act of self-salvation (*NSP*, 129v). And it involves somehow a replacement or re-direction of energy: energy that until then was devoted toward the growth of the soul now becomes invested in the growth of civilization.

The drive toward certainty is somehow fulfilled or caught by the Gnostic experiences in so far as they are an expansion of the soul to the point where God is drawn into the existence of man (*NSP*, 124).

The immanentization has 'phases' (already mentioned).

It also has 'variants' i.e. the teleological and the axiological and the activist-mystical (*NSP*, 120v). The first is the quite conservative attitude of getting slowly and gradually world and life 'better and bigger' every day. The second is the utopian attitude, simply posing an absolute claim of perfection without worrying about the way to go there. The third variant is the really revolutionary variant, where the way toward the absolute perfection is concretely spelled out as a 'turning around' of the nature of man by the way of revolutionary action.

Apart from these what may be called attitudinal variants there are also variants of content according to the faculty of man that is taken as 'central sphere' of immanentization. The expansion of the soul toward God may be primarily emotional, intellectual or volitional.

And finally, there is also a contextual component, that influences the specific direction of the 'drive toward certainty': mundane history as the field in which certainty has to be gained.

Some observations can be made regarding the status of 'immanentization' as a process.

Although at first sight the concept is used to characterize a certain historical period, the modern age and its first inklings in the 13th century, already in *The New Science of Politics* greater emphasis is put on the 'psychological' dynamics of immanentization.

In the subsequent work the key term then becomes 'consciousness'. In the later writings Voegelin elaborates more and more this side of the matter. From 1966 the theory of consciousness is presented as the centerpiece of the theory of politics and history (although some very important

essays on the theory of consciousness were written in the '40-ties, so they have to be seen in the background of *The New Science* as well).

As was already indicated, in the later writings the term 'immanentization' itself becomes less and less prominent. But the themes that are indicated in a nutshell in the pages just cited are deepened and elaborated upon very extensively. And it looks like Voegelin is constantly searching for more adequate analytical concepts to diagnose what perhaps can be described as a 'syndrome': egophanic or spiritual revolt, existential resistance, pneumapathology, the closed soul, loss of reality, refusal to apperceive, *anoia*, *nabala*, *morbus animi* etc. etc. (a shortlist is for example to be found in *In Search of Order* (OH V), 44-47). In a syndrome not one of the symptoms is by itself decisive for the diagnosis, but it is the pattern as a whole that matters. In every concrete case, even one or more of the specific symptoms might be missing. In my view the metaphor of the syndrome is a helpful tool of putting together the sometimes quite diverse analyses by Voegelin of what are obviously in his view related phenomena.

What are the elements of this syndrome of immanentization in Voegelins later work? I give a list (basically based on the Wisdom-essay and on *In Search of Order*)

1. Dissatisfaction with the existent order.
2. An awareness - that has spread in history in the wake of specific experiences of transcendence esp. in 'Jerusalem' and 'Athens' - that the world as it is is not necessarily or definitively as it is. There is a transcendent measure to which reality has to live up to.
3. An awareness of the tension between 1 and 2 and hence an awareness of the mystery of suffering in reality. Life can be death and death can be life. There is meaning *in* reality, but not all of reality is meaningful.

It is important to note that 1,2 and 3 are so to say the point of departure for immanentization, but do not force man to take this direction. In fact, in philosophy and in Christianity man is effectively prevented from doing so. They both challenge man to maintain what Voegelin calls the 'balance of consciousness' which can be seen as a balance between the acceptance of the mystery of suffering and at the same time affirming the meaning in reality.

Immanentization on the contrary may occur when people refuse to maintain this balance. The following symptoms then may occur.

4. Forgetfulness of the meaning *in* reality. Reality as a whole can be symbolized as negative.
5. As the tension between 1. and 2. is experienced within the human consciousness, the thought can come up very easily that the tension can as well be solved within the human consciousness. Perhaps the mystery of suffering is not only to be experienced in the consciousness, but it can overcome by it as well. The content of the consciousness can develop toward a supposed 'knowledge' of the recipe to overcome the suffering. The problem of reality is redefined as a problem of the consciousness.

6. In order to make this redefinition convincing one has to reinterpret reality as a correlate of the human consciousness. Everything that is 'other' than consciousness has to be suppressed, first in the consciousness and then in reality. Only consciousness appears in the consciousness (egophany).

7. In this suppression the literalization of symbols is an important factor. Symbols by definition originate as an expression of 'otherness', of transcendence. So they have to be reinterpreted as mere products of the consciousness.

8. The human imagination can produce images of reality that are in fact distortions of reality (and it can make use of the reinterpreted older symbols in articulating these images).

9. The consciousness can allow itself to be convinced by the distorted images and take the distorted image for the whole of reality. Voegelin calls this a 'Second reality' that eclipses the first reality.

10. Action is needed to bridge the gap between the 'Second reality' and the first reality, which is always a violent imposition of the image upon reality.

More and more, Voegelins work becomes a meditation on the different directions the consciousness can take. The immanentization becomes an option that is always there in the human consciousness as a *temptation*. His meditative analyses are meant to recognize the forms this temptation might take in his own concrete consciousness, but they are published as a help to the reader to recognize this temptation in her or his own consciousness.

For Voegelin it is very important to stress that the process of immanentization certainly has collective dimensions, but there is a way out for the individual. There is the option of a 'revolt against the revolt', of opting out of the 'collective unconscious' and making conscious what has been suppressed *and claiming public relevance for it*. So his analysis intends to leave intact the individual human responsibility for the own soul.

This might be one of the reasons why Voegelin is less and less interested in 'immanentization' as a historical process in Western modernity. More and more his analysis have their main thrust in the 'care of the soul', in what can be called 'political psycho-hygiene'.

7. Some conclusions

What does Voegelin's concept of 'immanentization' contribute compared to the other concepts dealt with in this paper? Only a few observations can be made here.

Compared to Weber's 'Entzauberung' the difference is there in at least three respects:

a. The immanentisation is clearly not the Weberian \blacklozenge Entzauberung \blacklozenge but is its opposite. It is the \blacklozenge re-enchantment \blacklozenge of the world but on the basis of a specific immanent point of view.

Immanentization for Voegelin does not refer to a disappearance of religion from the public scene, but to its *metamorphosis*. It refers to a 're-enchantment' of the world that had become 'de-divinized' in experiences of transcendence.

b. Weber had to leave the younger ones with an irrational choice between a strictly personal God and a strictly personal devil. Voegelin tries to analyse the different options within the consciousness as in terms of 'golden and iron cords', in terms of options that are true to reality and options that imply a selling of the soul to 'irreal' life-patterns. So the care of the soul is very important in Voegelin's analysis of the dynamics of immanentization.

c. The possibility of analyzing this dynamics in terms of good versus evil and hence allow for the possibility of theoretically resisting modern ideologies at a public-theoretical level.

Compared to Schmitt's concept of secularization

a. There is a parallel with Schmitt's way of interpreting an age with a view to its dominant metaphysics, especially where it comes to the religious character of the 'central sphere' of a societal order. For Schmitt also there is no disappearance of religion, but only a metamorphosis.

b. There is a parallel as well in that Schmitt actually seeks to maintain the distinction between good and evil in public life. However Schmitt actually allows for no intellectual tools to make that distinction otherwise than the blind decision. For Schmitt there is no 'measure' to which the political order has to orient itself.

c. Schmitt's analyses confine themselves to the 'history of ideas', Voegelin attempts to analyze experiences of consciousness. As a basis for resistance against the modern age Schmitt has only the submission to the authority of the dogma (and where the dogma is silent, there is the irrational decision), while Voegelin can so to say can dive into the experiential depth of the dogma (or better: of the symbols) and hence is more sensitive in distinguishing between right and wrong in modernity.

Compared to Blumenberg's 'Umbesetzung':

a. There is a similarity in that both Blumenberg and Voegelin are not satisfied with the analysis of historical changes of ideas in terms of dependency and derivation. There has to be a kind of constant structure in man that drives him to ask questions. In the answers given there can be different options: mythical, religious, scientific etc.

b. There is a difference in that for Voegelin these answers can be analyzed and compared in a systematic order. Moreover, each of these answers also have their negative possibility that goes with them and which also can be analyzed. And analysis implies here as well: to make a judgment about their adequacy, their truth.